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We discuss the issue of distributed and cooperative decision-making in a network game of public
service location. Each node of the network can choose to be a provider of service which is accessible
to the provider itself and also to all the neighboring nodes. A node may also choose only to be
a consumer, and then it has to pay a tax, and the collected tax is evenly distributed to all the
service providers to remedy their cost. If nodes do not communicate with each other but make
individual best-response decisions, the system will be trapped in an inefficient situation of high tax
level. In this work we investigate a decentralized local-consensus selection mechanism, according
to which nodes in need of service recommend their neighbors of highest local impact as candidate
servers, and a node may become a server only if all its non-server neighbors give their assent. We
demonstrate that this local-consensus mechanism, although only involving information exchange
among neighboring nodes, leads to socially efficient solutions with tax level approaching the lowest
possible value. Our results may help in understanding and improving collective problem-solving in
various networked social systems and robotic systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The healthy functioning of a human society depends on
various public services or facilities such as schools, hos-
pitals, parks, garbage disposal plants, and so on. Con-
structing and maintaining public service is costly and the
costs are paid by members of the whole society through
tax. On the other hand it is often the case that a service
(e.g., a hospital) located at one place will serve not only
the people of this place but also the people of neighbor-
ing places. Therefore the total cost of fulfilling the needs
of the whole society can be considerably reduced by ap-
propriately choosing the service provider locations. This
task of choosing the locations of public service is an im-
portant and challenging issue faced by a modern human
society, and it is also an active research topic in the fields
of algorithmic game theory [1] and network game [2–4].
Governmental institutions may prefer to solve such
public service location problems in a top-down and cen-
tralized manner. A central planner will collect all the
needed information about the network property of the
social system, and then it will take this structural knowl-
edge as input to a global optimization algorithm to ob-
tain a minimum-cost solution. But such a centralized
approach has drawbacks. Firstly it requires a central
planner and requires complete information about the net-
worked system, and secondly the vast members of the
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society are not involved in the decision process and their
individual preferences are not necessarily incorporated.
This latter lack of involvement may cause people to sus-
pect that their interests are compromised and may then
induce strong friction and unwillingness. There are many
recent large-scale events of such types of distrust and
friction. For example in 2007 some residents in Xiamen
(a major city of southeast China) protested against the
planned settlement of a PX (paraxylene) plant for fear of
unexpected health and environment effects, which even-
tually forced the relocation of this chemical plant [5].
A completely different approach for solving the public
service location problem is to let individual agents make
choices in best response to the choices of their neighbor-
ing agents. If an agent can access service from a neighbor
in the network, it will have no motivation to be a service
provider itself, and an agent will choose to be a service
provider only if none of its network neighbors offers ser-
vice. Such a free-market approach has been investigated
in the recent literature [2–4, 6, 7], and it was found that
the resulting maximal independent-set solutions are far
from being socially efficient.
In the present work, we propose a local-consensus se-
lection mechanism for solving the public service loca-
tion problem. This decentralized approach lies between
the above-mentioned centralized and individualized ap-
proaches. Briefly speaking, the basic rules of this mecha-
nism are that agents in need of service recommend their
network neighbors of highest local impact (to be pre-
cisely defined later) as candidate service providers, and
an agent may become a service provider only if all its
non-server neighbors are happy with this arrangement.
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2This distributed selection mechanism does not require
the global structural information of the system but only
involves local-scale information exchange. Yet very en-
couragingly, we find that it leads to socially efficient solu-
tions with tax level approaching the lowest possible value.
Our theoretical results suggest that distributed
decision-making through local consensus can be an ef-
ficient mechanism for solving the network public service
location problem. This collective mechanism may also
be useful for other network resource allocation problems
[8–11]. In addition it may have potential applications
in robotic swarm systems for collective problem-solving
[12] and be relevant to the research branch of distributed
algorithmic mechanism design [13, 14].
We describe the public service location problem in the
next section; then the best-response dynamics (Sec. III),
the centralized planning approach (Sec. IV), and the
local-consensus mechanism (Sec. V) are discussed and
their performances are compared. We conclude this work
in Sec. VI. Some technical details are given in the two ap-
pendices.
II. THE PUBLIC SERVICE LOCATION
PROBLEM
Let us consider a society formed by N agents each
of which interacting with a set of neighboring agents.
The neighborhood property is reciprocal so that if agent
i is a neighbor of agent j then j is also a neighbor of
i. Every agent is dependent on certain essential public
service provided by itself or by its neighbors [2, 4]. We
assume that the provision of this service is costly for an
agent (without loss of generality this cost is set to be
unity), but once it is provided by one agent it will be
accessible to all the neighboring agents (Fig. 1). Because
of this non-excludable nature of the public service, an
agent does not need to provide service if at least one
of its neighbors is already providing it. This is referred
to as a property of strategic substitutes in the literature
[2, 3]). If the service costs are borne only by the service
providers, naturally every agent will not volunteer to be
a provider but will wait the neighboring agents to do so,
leading to extortion and the “tragedy of the commons”.
The only fair solution under this cost no-sharing rule will
then be that every agent is a service provider, which is
not socially efficient as the total cost to the society is the
maximum.
In this paper, therefore, we assume that the agents
have reached the agreement that free-riding is not allowed
and that the total service cost is evenly shared by all the
agents in the society. The challenge faced by this society
is then a mechanism design problem: how to choose an
appropriate set of agents as service providers such that
each agent is accessible to the service.
We can represent this public service location problem
by a network G of N nodes and M links. Each node of
this network represents an agent and the link (i, j) be-
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FIG. 1: An illustration of the public service location prob-
lem. There are N = 11 nodes (agents) and M = 16 links
in this example system. Nodes 4, 7, and 10 are the servers
and the total cost of providing service is then N1 = 3. All
the other eight nodes are the consumers which access service
from the neighboring server nodes. Each consumer has to pay
a tax τ = 3
11
.
tween two nodes i and j signifies that i can access the ser-
vice produced by j and j can access the service produced
by i (Fig. 1). The network structure is fixed in time,
while each node i can choose to be a service provider
(server, denoted by occupation state ci = 1) or just be
a consumer (state ci = 0) and it might change between
these two choices over time. A solution of this public
service location problem is then an occupation configu-
ration c ≡ (c1, c2, . . . , cN ) such that each node is either
a server (e.g., nodes 4 and 7 in Fig. 1) or is a consumer
surrounded by one or more servers (e.g., nodes 2 and 6 in
Fig. 1). The total number N1 of servers in the solution c
is then the total service cost of the system, and n1 ≡ N1N
is the fraction of servers. Because of the fair-sharing rule,
each consumer needs to pay a tax τ = n1 and each server
will receive a subsidy (1− τ) so as to reduce its net cost
back to τ .
The question we address in this paper is: How should
the agents make decisions about who should be the
servers so that a solution c with sufficiently low number
N1 of servers can be achieved? In the next section we will
demonstrate that if every agent makes choice individu-
ally and without any cooperation, the final fraction n1
of servers (and hence the tax level τ) can not be reduced
below certain high level. We will then offer a decentral-
ized mechanism of cooperative decision-making to solve
this challenging issue efficiently.
III. BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS
Our public service location problem actually is a net-
work game [3, 15] in which each agent makes decision un-
der the strong self-interest of having access to the service
and the weak incentive of lowering the number of servers.
A simplest decision-making strategy is best response to
the current situation of the neighborhood [2, 7, 16]. If
an agent i has one or more neighboring servers it just
chooses to be a consumer (ci = 0), otherwise it chooses
to be a server (ci = 1). Starting from an initial condition
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FIG. 2: The fraction n1 of servers on a large ER random
network of N = 105 nodes and mean node degree c = 10
during the best response dynamics. At each time interval
δt = 1/N a node i is chosen uniformly at random from the
network and its occupation state (ci = 1 or ci = 0) is then
updated. The three curves correspond to three different initial
conditions with fraction of servers being 0.5, 0.24 and 0.0,
respectively.
(for example, all the agents have not yet determined),
the agents update their choices non-synchronously until
all are satisfied with their last choice. After a transient
period of choice changes, this best response dynamics will
converge to a solution c, i.e., a Nash Equilibrium (NE)
of the game, in which all the servers are separated from
each other and every consumer has at least one neighbor-
ing server. The set of servers of this solution c therefore
is just a maximal independent set of the network G [6].
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the fraction n1 of
serves on a single Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random network
with N = 105 agents and M = 5 × 105 links (on av-
erage each agent has c = 10 neighbors). The M links of
an ER network are chosen uniformly at random from the
total number N(N − 1)/2 of possible links. We notice
that the final value of n1 ≈ 0.240 reached by this best re-
sponse dynamics is independent of the initial conditions
and it is in excellent agreement with the predicted value
of n1 = ln(11)/10 ≈ 0.2398 by a mean field theory (see [6]
or Appendix A). In general, the final fraction of servers
reached by the best response dynamics is n1 = ln(1+c)/c
for an ER network of mean node degree c (Fig. 3A).
The same converging behavior is observed for many
other random network instances and real-world network
instances. Every node in a regular random (RR) network
has the same integer degree K (so the mean degree c =
K). For such a network the fraction of servers converges
to the final value n1 = [1− (K − 1)2/(2−K)]/2 (Fig. 3B)
[17]. The node degrees of an exponential network obey
an exponential distribution with mean value c. For such
a random network we find that the fraction of servers
converges to n1 = [(1 + 3c)
2/3 − 1]/(2c) [see Eq. (A24)].
We also consider scale-free (SF) random networks
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FIG. 3: The tax level that is necessary for three different
decision-making protocols: the best response dynamics (gray
circles), the local-consensus dynamics (green diamonds), and
the centralized planning (black squares). Each data point is
the averaged result obtained on 64 network instances with
N = 105 nodes and mean node degree c. We consider three
types of random networks, namely ER networks (A), RR net-
works (B), and SF networks (C) with decay exponent γ = 3.0
generated through the static model [18].
which are better models of real-world networked sys-
tems than ER or other homogeneous random networks
[19]. A SF network is very heterogeneous in the sense
that the probability P (d) of a randomly chosen node to
have d attached links decays with d in a power-law form
P (d) ∝ d−γ with exponent γ > 2. There are many highly
connected nodes in such a network, however we find that
this structural property does not help to improve the
performance of the best-response mechanism (Fig. 3C).
On the contrary, compared with ER and RR networks of
4TABLE I: Solving the public service location problem on
eight real-world networks. For each network, we show the
number of nodes N , the number of links M , the mean fraction
n1 of server nodes in the solutions obtained by three methods,
namely the best-response (BR) dynamics, the local-consensus
(LC) dynamics, and by the global BPD algorithm [20].
N M BR LC BPD
Facebook [21] 4039 88234 0.189 0.00248 0.00248
PowerGrid [22] 4941 6594 0.486 0.310 0.300
CondMat [23] 23133 93439 0.357 0.158 0.156
Gnutella [24] 62586 147892 0.597 0.202 0.201
LocGowalla [25] 196591 950327 0.478 0.214 0.212
DBPL [26] 317080 1049866 0.416 0.147 0.147
RoadNet-PA [27] 1088092 1541898 0.423 0.334 0.305
YouTube [26] 1134890 298624 0.615 0.188 0.188
the same (mean) node degree c, the final server fraction
needed in a SF network is even higher. The best-response
mechanism also performs poorly on real-world network
instances (Table I).
IV. CENTRALIZED PLANNING
If there is a central planner who has complete struc-
tural information about the network G, this central plan-
ner can try to get an optimized solution c for the public
service location problem by global optimization and then
appoints some agents as servers accordingly. Actually
the set Γ of severs, with the property that every node
in G either belongs to Γ or has a neighboring node in
Γ, is nothing but a dominating node set for network G
[28, 29]. Therefore an optimal service location solution
corresponds to a minimum dominating set, which has the
smallest cardinality among all possible dominating sets.
Unfortunately the minimum dominating set problem is
a NP-hard (nondeterministic polynomial hard) combina-
torial optimization problem, meaning that a guaranteed
optimal solution can only be obtained by checking an
exponential number of candidate solutions. In practice
one can only solve the minimum dominating set problem
approximately, and so far the best way appears to be con-
verting it to a spin glass model and then treating it by
methods of statistical physics [30]. Such a spin glass ap-
proach can offer an estimate about the size of minimum
dominating sets, and it also offers a powerful message-
passing algorithm called BPD (belief propagation-guided
decimation) for solving single network instance. For ran-
dom networks, the solutions obtained by the BPD al-
gorithm are very close to be minimum dominating sets
[20]. To be self-contained, some technical details of this
algorithm are given in Appendix B.
Here we use the result obtained by the BPD algorithm
as a good proxy of the true optimal solution. By ap-
plying the BPD algorithm to the ER network instance
of Fig. 2 we obtain a service location solution c with a
fraction n1 = 0.121 of servers, which is much better than
the solutions (n1 ≈ 0.240) obtained by the best-response
dynamics. This result confirms that the service location
solutions obtained by the best-response dynamics cost
too much to the society. The same conclusion holds for
other random networks (Fig. 3) and real-world network
instances (Table I).
Although BPD or other global optimization methods
can obtain socially efficient solutions for the public ser-
vice location problem, such centralized mechanism design
approaches may not be feasible in some social systems if
either the central planner is absent or the computational
burden on the central planner is unmanageable; even if
they are feasible they may be unfavorable among mem-
bers of a society for fear of manipulation. Is it possible to
achieve close-to-optimal solutions for the public service
location problem through distributed planning? We give
a positive answer to this question in the next section.
V. THE LOCAL-CONSENSUS MECHANISM
We now propose a local-consensus collective selection
mechanism to reach a cooperative solution for the public
service location problem. Let us define the impact fi of
a node i as follows: If i is a server (ci = 1), its impact fi
is the total number of consumers which rely exclusively
on i, i.e., the consumers who can not access the service
any longer once i changes to be a consumer; if i is a
consumer (ci = 0), its impact is the increase in the num-
ber of served nodes if i becomes a server (see Fig. 4 for
concrete examples). The impact of a node changes with
time during the local-consensus dynamics. We assume
that every node can read the latest impact values of all
its neighbors and their latest occupation states as well.
In our local-consensus mechanism the servers for the
network are assigned sequentially until every node is be-
ing served (namely, it is either a server or has one or more
servers among its neighbors). Initially there is no server
in the network and all the nodes are unserved consumers
with the impact of a node i simply being fi = 1 + di,
where the degree di is the number of this node’s neigh-
bors (Fig. 4A). At each elementary time interval every
non-server node i checks its neighborhood: if i is un-
served (having no neighboring server), then it regards a
neighboring node j as suitable to be a server if and only
if j has the highest impact among i’s neighboring nodes
and fj is no less than fi; if node i is served (having at
least one neighboring server) then it regards a neighbor-
ing unserved node k as suitable to be a sever if fk ≥ fi.
An unserved node becomes a server candidate if it is
regarded as a suitable server by all its neighbors (e.g.,
node 1 in Fig. 4A), while for a served non-server node,
it becomes a server candidate if only all the neighboring
unserved nodes recommend it as a server (e.g., node 12
in Fig. 4B). There will be one or more non-server nodes
which are evaluated as server candidates. One node (say
k) is selected uniformly at random from these candidates
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FIG. 4: The local-consensus selection mechanism for solv-
ing the public service location problem distributively and co-
operatively. Blue nodes are servers, green nodes are served
consumers, and white nodes are unserved consumers. The
non-negative integer beside a node is its impact, which might
changes with the game process. (A) Initially there is no server
node, and node 1 is the only candidate server who is agreed
by all its neighbors. (B) After node 1 changes to be a server,
all its neighbors are served, and then {3, 5, 8, 11, 12} becomes
the set of candidates. (D)-(E) Nodes 12, 5 and 11 are then se-
quentially chosen as server nodes by the local-consensus rule,
resulting in a server arrangement with node 12 having zero
impact. (F) Node 12 is changed back to be a consumer, re-
sulting in the final server set {1, 5, 11}, which is an optimal
solution.
to be a server (ck = 1), and then all its neighbors up-
date their impacts and the game process repeats (see
Fig. 4B-4E). After all the servers are selected through
such a local-consensus mechanism, if a server node has
zero impact (e.g., node 12 in Fig. 4E), then it is changed
back to be a consumer. This polish process is carried out
in a random sequential manner until all the remaining
servers have positive impact (Fig. 4F). After the final set
of server nodes is obtained (whose relative size being n1),
the tax level τ is then set to τ = n1 so that every node
bears the same cost independent of its role.
Applying this local-consensus mechanism to the ER
network of Fig. 2, the server fraction of obtained solutions
is n1 ≈ 0.140, which is a big drop as compared with the
server fraction of n1 ≈ 0.240 of the best-response mecha-
nism, and it is only slightly beyond the server fraction of
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.139 0.140 0.141 0.142
P
( n
1
)
n1
FIG. 5: Comparing the performances of the local-consensus
selection mechanism and the greedy highest-impact algorithm
[28, 31, 32] on an ER network of N = 105 nodes and M =
5 × 105 links. Each histogram P (n1) of server fraction n1 is
obtained by sampling 960 independent solutions.
n1 ≈ 0.121 reached by the global BPD algorithm. This
local-consensus mechanism also leads to a big drop in the
fraction of servers for other ER random network instances
and RR networks and also for scale-free random networks
whose structures are very heterogeneous (Fig. 3). Its per-
formance on real-world network instances is also very en-
couraging, as the solutions obtained by local-consensus
and those obtained by the global BPD algorithm are al-
most equally good in terms of server fractions n1 (Ta-
ble I), and they are much better than the solutions ob-
tained by the best-response dynamics.
Compared with the central planning approach, a nice
advantage of the local-consensus mechanism is that each
node does not need to know the structure of the whole
network G but only needs to know who are the neighbors
and what are their states (server, unserved or served con-
sumer) and current impact values. The essence of this
decentralized mechanism is that the nodes recommend
their highest-impact neighbors as candidate servers. An
unserved node will only be selected as a server if it cur-
rently has the highest impact among its neighbors and
the neighbors of its unserved neighbors. Through this
mechanism, a served consumer node may change to be a
server in response to the recommendation of all its un-
served neighbors.
From the algorithmic point of view, the local-consensus
mechanism is very similar to a greedy algorithm which
repeatedly selects among the whole network a highest-
impact consumer node and changes it into a server
[28, 31, 32]. Interestingly, we observe that the perfor-
mance of the local-consensus mechanism slightly outper-
forms this greedy algorithm (Fig. 5). This surprising dif-
ference can be explained by two factors: first the local-
consensus mechanism does not perform a global ranking
of nodes based on their impact values, so a node of low
impact value may become a server earlier than a node
6of much higher impact value; and second, and more im-
portantly, the local-consensus selection mechanism may
convert a served consumer i to a server even if i has
neighbors of higher impact values.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper we considered the public service location
problem as a cooperative game among N agents in a
network, and presented a local-consensus selection mech-
anism through which a set of high-impact agents are ap-
pointed as service providers. We demonstrated that this
decentralized selection mechanism can reduce the soci-
etal cost of providing service to a low level that is close
to the lowest-possible value.
From the theoretical point of view, the demonstrated
excellent performance of the local-consensus mechanism
is very encouraging. Our work suggests that it is theoreti-
cally possible to efficiently solve the service location prob-
lem by distributed decision-making. The local-consensus
mechanism does not need a central planner and it does
not require the structural knowledge about the whole
network. Furthermore, every agent participates in the
decision-making process and its opinion has been incor-
porated in the final cooperative solution, which may help
stabilizing the solution.
For simplicity we ignored the issue of congestion in ac-
cessing service, but this is itself an interesting factor to
explore [7]. We didn’t discuss the actual implementation
of the local-consensus mechanism. Instead we assumed
the ideal situation that every agent is cooperative and
obeys the microscopic rules of the local-consensus mech-
anism. The practical feasibility of the local-consensus
mechanism is an issue to be addressed in future empiri-
cal studies.
Collective problem-solving, division of labor, and role
specialization are common not only in human societies
but also in various other social systems such as social in-
sects (e.g., ants and bees) and biological multi-cellular
systems [33–35] and swarms of robots [12, 36]. For
robotic systems, it might be relatively easy to implement
the local-consensus decision-making mechanism to facil-
itate efficient division of labor and collective problem-
solving.
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Appendix A: Mean field theory for the best
response dynamics
In this appendix we present a mean field theory to
compute the final fraction n1 of occupied (server) nodes
under the best response dynamics. This theory is ap-
plicable for a generic random network with node degree
distribution P (d). It focuses on the evolution of the fol-
lowing quantities:
Nu(t): mean number of unserved nodes at time t;
Pu(d; t): probability that at time t a randomly cho-
sen unserved node has degree d;
H1(t): mean value of the sum of degrees of all the
occupied nodes at time t;
H0(t): mean value of the sum of degrees of all the
unoccupied nodes at time t;
Hu(t): mean value of the sum of degrees of all the
unserved nodes at time t.
Initially all the nodes are unoccupied so H0(0) =
2M = Nc, where c is the mean node degree. At each
time interval δt ≡ 1N a randomly chosen unserved node
is occupied, therefore
H0(t+ δt) = H0(t)−
∑
d
Pu(d; t)d . (A1)
On the other hand, H1(0) = 0 and
H1(t+ δt) = H1(t) +
∑
d
Pu(d; t)d . (A2)
The mean accumulated degree Hu(t) is expressed as
Hu(t) = Nu(t)
∑
d
Pu(d; t)d . (A3)
Initially all the nodes are unserved, Nu(0) = N . At
each time interval δt a randomly chosen unserved node is
occupied and all the unserved neighbors of this newly oc-
cupied node become served. Since the nearest neighbors
of each occupied node are all unoccupied, the probability
at time t of a randomly chosen neighbor of an unserved
node also being unserved is equal to Hu(t)
H0(t)−H1(t) . Conse-
quently the evolution of the number of unserved nodes is
governed by
Nu(t+ δt) = Nu(t)− 1−
∑
d
Pu(d; t)
Hu(t)d
H0(t)−H1(t)
.
(A4)
From this equation we can obtain the evolution equation
for Pu(d; t) as
Pu(d; t+ δt) =
Pu(d; t)
[
1− 1
Nu(t)
−
Hu(t)d
H0(t)−H1(t)
Nu(t)
]
1− 1
Nu(t)
−
Hu(t)
H0(t)−H1(t)
∑
d′ Pu(d′;t)d′
Nu(t)
.
(A5)
7Let us define several intensive quantities h(t), hu(t),
ρu(t), and cu(t) as:
h(t) ≡ [H0(t)−H1(t)]/N , (A6a)
hu(t) ≡ Hu(t)/N , (A6b)
ρu(t) ≡ Nu(t)/N , (A6c)
cu(t) ≡
∑
d
Pu(d; t)d . (A6d)
ρu(t) is the fraction of unserved nodes at time t, and
cu(t) is the mean degree of unserved nodes at time t.
From Eq. (A3) we know that
hu(t) = ρu(t)cu(t) . (A7)
Furthermore, at the limit of N →∞ we have
∂h(t)
∂t
= −2cu(t) , (A8)
∂ρu(t)
∂t
= −1− hu(t)
h(t)
cu(t) , (A9)
and the evolution of Pu(d; t) is governed by
∂Pu(d; t)
∂t
= Pu(d; t)
hu(t)
ρu(t)h(t)
[
cu(t)− d
]
. (A10)
Combining Eq. (A10) and Eq. (A7) we can obtain an
explicit expression for Pu(d; t) as
Pu(d; t) =
P (d) exp
(−d ∫ t
0
cu(t
′)
h(t′) dt
′)∑
d′
P (d′) exp
(−d′ ∫ t
0
cu(t′)
h(t′) dt
′) . (A11)
Because of Eq. (A8) we know that
t∫
0
cu(t
′)
h(t′)
dt′ = −1
2
ln
[h(t)
c
]
. (A12)
Plugging this expression into Eq. (A11) we finally obtain
that
Pu(d; t) =
P (d)
[
h(t)/c
]d/2∑
d′
P (d′)
[
h(t)/c
]d′/2 . (A13)
while h(t) is obtained by solving the self-consistent equa-
tion
∂h(t)
∂t
= −2
∑
d
P (d)d
[
h(t)/c
]d/2
∑
d′
P (d′)
[
h(t)/c
]d′/2 . (A14)
With h(t) known, we can then obtain cu(t) from Eq. (A8)
and then apply Eq. (A9) to obtain ρu(t) as the solution
of the following differential equation
∂ρu(t)
∂t
= −1− ρu(t)
[
cu(t)
]2
h(t)
. (A15)
As time t increases the fraction ρu(t) of unserved nodes
decreases continuously and approaches zero at certain
threshold time t∗, i.e., ρu(t∗) = 0. Since a node is occu-
pied at each time interval δt, the final fraction n1 of occu-
pied nodes during this best response dynamics is simply
n1 = t
∗.
In the following subsections we apply this mean field
theory to several simple network ensembles.
1. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network
The degree distribution for an ER network is
P (d) =
e−ccd
d!
, (A16)
For this random network ensemble we have
h(t) = c(1− t)2 , (A17a)
cu(t) = c(1− t) , (A17b)
ρu(t) =
1 + c
c
e−ct − 1
c
. (A17c)
Therefore the fraction of occupied nodes n1 is
n1 =
ln(1 + c)
c
. (A18)
Equation (A18) was derived earlier in Ref. [6] following
the probabilistic approach of Ref. [17].
2. Regular random network
In a regular random network every node has the same
(integer) degree c = K, therefore
P (d) = δKd . (A19)
For this random network ensemble we have
h(t) = K(1− 2t) , (A20a)
cu(t) = K , (A20b)
ρu(t) =
K − 1
K − 2(1− 2t)
K/2 − 1− 2t
K − 2 . (A20c)
Therefore the fraction of occupied nodes n1 is
n1 =
1
2
[
1− (K − 1) 22−K ] . (A21)
Equation (A21) was derived earlier in Ref. [17].
3. Exponential random network
The degree distribution for an exponential random net-
work of mean degree c is
P (d) =
1
1 + c
( c
1 + c
)d
. (A22)
8For this random network ensemble we have
h(t) =
(1 + c−√1 + 2ct)2
c
, (A23a)
cu(t) =
1 + c−√1 + 2ct√
1 + 2ct
, (A23b)
ρu(t) =
1
3c
[ 1 + 3c√
1 + 2ct
− (1 + 2ct)
]
. (A23c)
Therefore the fraction of occupied nodes n1 is
n1 =
(1 + 3c)
2
3 − 1
2c
. (A24)
The correctness of Eq. (A24) has been confirmed by our
numerical simulation results.
Appendix B: The BPD algorithm for the service
location problem
Selecting a minimum set of agents as service providers
in a network is an intrinsically difficult combinatorial op-
timization problem. In the computer science literature
this problem is usually referred to as the minimum dom-
inating set problem. The spin glass model for the mini-
mum dominating set problem and the associated replica-
symmetric mean field theory have already been discussed
in great detail [20]. Here we briefly review this mean field
theory and the BPD message-passing algorithm.
Given an input network G, the marginal probability
qcii that a node i of this graph is in the occupation state
ci ∈ {0, 1} is estimated by
qcii =
e−xci
∏
j∈∂i
∑
cj
q
(cj ,ci)
j→i − δci0
∏
j∈∂i
q
(0,0)
j→i∑
c′i
e−xc′i
∏
j∈∂i
∑
cj
q
(cj ,c′i)
j→i −
∏
j∈∂i
q
(0,0)
j→i
, (B1)
where x is a positive re-weighting parameter; the Kro-
necker symbol δnm = 1 if m = n and δ
n
m = 0 if otherwise;
and ∂i denotes the set of neighboring nodes of node i.
For a link (i, j) between two nodes i and j, we denote by
q
(cj ,ci)
j→i the joint probability that i is in occupation state
ci and j is in occupation state cj when the constraint of
node i (that is, i should be occupied or be surrounded by
at least one occupied neighobr) is not considered. This
‘cavity’ probabiity can be evaluated through the follow-
ing belief-propagation (BP) equation:
q
(cj ,ci)
j→i =
e−xcj
∏
k∈∂j\i
∑
ck
q
(ck,cj)
k→j − δci+cj0
∏
k∈∂j\i
q
(0,0)
k→j∑
c′i,c
′
j
e−xc
′
j
∏
k∈∂j\i
∑
c′k
q
(c′k,c
′
j)
k→j −
∏
k∈∂j\i
q
(0,0)
k→j
,
(B2)
where ∂j\i denotes the subset obtained by deleting node
i from set ∂j.
Equations (B1) and (B2) are exploited by the BPD al-
gorithm to construct a near-optimal dominating set for
the network G. The details of the BPD algorithm are
given in [20]. Roughly speaking, at each round of the
BPD process, first the BP equation (B2) is iterated on
the network a few number of times, then the occupation
prababilities qcii of all the unoccupied nodes i are esti-
mated by Eq. (B1), and then those nodes with the high-
est probabilities of being occupied are set to be occupied.
More and more nodes become occupied as the BPD pro-
cess continues, and it stops as soon as a dominating set
is reached.
The sizes of dominating sets constructed by the BPD
algorithm are not sensitive to the re-weighting parameter
x [20]. We fix the value of x to be x = 10 in the present
work.
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